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There is a need for better cost estimating and forecasting for highway work in the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky. The objective of this study, approved July 1993, is to 
investigate current practices and to recommend improvements for the estimating process. 
This report details the finding of the first eight months of the research effort and outlines the 
path forward. 
The Kentucky Transportation Cabinet (KyTC) is responsible for the creation of a six-year 
highway construction plan listing proposed projects which reflects the highway needs of the 
state. The Legislature approves those projects that will be funded in the coming biennium. 
This biennial element must be fiscally balanced by matching projected annual funding 
against estimated project costs. Funding decisions are based on the estimated cost of the 
work scope as defined at the time the estimate was prepared~ Reasonable cost forecasts for 
new and ongoing projects are required to ensure that funding is available and projects can be 
advanced on an orderly schedule. 
KRS45.245, effective 1 July, 1992, grants the Interim Joint Committee on Transportation 
(IJCT) oversight of the biennial highway plan. Any phase of an authorized highway project-
-design, right of way, utility relocation. or construction--that exceeds the estimate shown in 
the plan by 15% must be reviewed by the IJCT. In recent years the KyTC has suffered the 
loss of many resources--personnel, funding, and experience--necessary to produce good cost 
estimates. 
Estimates developed using current methods have not proven sufficiently accurate to preclude 
cost overruns in excess of 15%. During the current biennium to date (7/1192- 2/13/94) 134 
overruns, totaling $69,503,094, have been submitted to the IJCT. All have been approved 
for additional funding. fiNo concerted effort was made to track the number of cost underruns. 4 
The main cause of cost overruns was project scope changes after initial estimates were made. 
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Offices, which have neither funds nor resources allotted to estimating. Initial estimates, 
based on very little information, don't statistically support a ±15% confidence level. Unless 
these estimates can be updated before they appear in the biennial highway plan they are 
likely to be the cause ofiJCT action later. 
Other states face many of the same problems with cost forecasting as Kentucky does. A 
noticeable difference is that most states have no legislative control after budget approval, and 
poor estimates aren't considered a problem as long as total project overruns and underruns 
are approximately equal. Many states have better estimating procedures than does Kentucky, 
primarily attributable to more resources and better funding. 
There are three ways to mitigate the problem of poor cost forecasting. The first is for the 
LegislatUre to either forego the oversight or to modifY it so the KyTC can meet the 
requirements with current staffing levels, the second is for the KyTC to change how the 
highway plan is developed, and the third is for the KyTC to staff up as necessary to improve 
its estimating ability. All of these options have financial and political implications. 
Currently, a feeling of mistrust exists between the Legislature and the KyTC. To date, the 
IJCT has summarily approved all overruns presented to it; preparing justifications for these 
overruns has consumed valuable KyTC resources. fEstimators are now padding estimates to 
reduce the likelihood of having to justifY future overruns.f This practice leads to having to 
haphazardly advance new project phases into the biennial plan to avoid losing available 
federal funds. 
This study offers an opportunity to make improvements to the KyTC's cost forecasting 
ability and to the relationship between the K yTC and the Legislature. To seize this 
opportunity both the Legislature and the KyTC must co=unicate openly with each other, 
and with the researcher, in an effort to find a workable solution which considers both 
political and fiscal realities. 
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The KyTC should be proactive in looking for innovative ways to improve both estimates and 
relations with the Legislature. Some promising areas involve more study prior to adding a 
project to the highway plan, better use of historical data through computer technology, and 
creating a budget for estimating. 
The Legislature should be proactive by passing laws to mitigate scope growth of projects and 
by explaining to the KyTC exactly what is expected of them. Two important issues are ways 
to reduce escalation of right of way costs after project routes are determined, and the 
funding of unanticipated environmental costs. Relaxing the requirement that the K yTC 
document, in detail, and formally present, all phase cost overruns >IS% would lessen the 
burden of Cabinet personnel--the same ones that should be producing better estimates. Phase 
overruns which are actually caused by poor practices and/or might be subject to other than 
summary approval by the IJCT, should continue to be formally reported. 
Emphasis for the remainder of this year and for Year 2 of this study will be on new and/or 
modified procedures and tools to improve the estimating and cost forecasting ability of the 
KyTC. In Year 3, KyTC personnel will be trained on the new/modified procedures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a need for better cost estimating and forecasting for highway work in the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky. This need has been recognized by the Kentucky 
Transportation Cabinet (KyTC), the Kentucky Legislature and the Federal Highway 
Administration (FHW A). A research project was approved by the KyTC and the FHW A, 
starting in July, 1993, to study current practices and to recommend improvements for the 
estimating process. The project timetable specifies the following annual goals: 
• Year 1 (7 /93-6/94) - Study current practices and problems, and make preliminary 
recommendations for potential improvement areas. 
• Year 2 (7/94-6/95) - Develop and/or modify procedures and tools to improve the 
estimating process. 
• Year 3 (7 /95-6/96) - Implement improvements and train KyTC personnel in their use. 
This report discusses the findings of the first eight months of the project: 
• The need for good cost estimates 
• Estimates during the current biennium 
• Estimating practices in Kentucky 
• Estimating practices in other states 
The impetus for improving cost forecasting for highway work comes from a recent law 
passed during the 1992 General Assembly session. KRS 45.245, effective July 1, 1992, 
mandates that the amount authorized for expenditure on any project phase--design, right-of-
way, utility relocation or construction--cannot exceed that stated in the current biennium 
highway plan by more than 15% without being presented by the KyTC to the Legislature's 
Interim Joint Committee on Transportation (IJCT) for review. The presentation to the IJCT 
must include written certification from the State Highway Engineer that the overrun was 
caused by unanticipated circumstances, and provide specific details on the reasons for the 
cost overrun. The IJCT determines if the proposed additional money is reasonable and 
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Assembly materially changed the project. 
Methodology used by the researchers during the period covered by this report consisted of: 
• a literature search to investigate published material on estimating and cost forecasting for 
highway projects, 
• visits to the twelve district highway offices where discussions were held with district 
preconstruction engineers, and others, on the strengths and weaknesses of current 
estimating practices, 
• a follow-up questionnaire to elicit responses to commonly voiced problems and potential 
solutions, 
• interviews with KyTC top appointed officials and two key legislators to obtain their 
perceptions of needed changes, 
• a joint meeting with district preconstruction engineers, several KyTC department heads, 
and others to discuss common problems and potential solutions, 
• phone contact with preconstruction personnel in aU 50 states and the District of Columbia 
to ask about current practices for estimating highway costs in their areas, 
• an analysis of cost overruns approved by the IJCT during the current biennium, and 
• the development of a preliminary cost per mile database. 
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FOR GOOD ESTIMATES 
The KyTC is responsible for the creation of a six-year highway construction plan (6YP). 
This plan is a listing of proposed projects which reflects the highway needs of the state. The 
Legislature approves those projects that will appear in the biennial element--in this report 
called the two year plan (2YP). The 2YP is fiscally balanced by matching projected annual 
funding against estimated project costs. 
The Program Management Office (Programming Staff) of the KyTC is responsible for 
creating the draft 6YP that is submitted to the General Assembly for approval. In preparing 
the 6YP, the Programming Staff balances estimated project costs with the projected budget 
for highway construction over the following six years. Proposed projects, in order to be 
considered, must have a cost estimate, by phase, to allow the Programming Staff to balance 
the draft 6YP. Funding decisions are based on the estimated cost of the work scope as 
defined at the time the estimate was prepared. 
A cost estimate is a forecast of the actual costs to be incurred in completing a given scope of 
work. Estimates are used for planning, budgeting and controlling projects. Reasonable cost 
forecasts for new and ongoing projects are required to ensure that funding is available and 
projects can be advanced on an orderly schedule. 
A necessary first step in producing a good estimate is to define what a good estimate is. 
Generally, a good cost estimate is one that is approximately equal to the final cost. There 
can be other definitions as well. If an estimate is used to set a maximum or minimum cost, 
then a good estimate is one that sets a limit which the final cost does not exceed. For 
example, the IJCT might consider a high estimate, which has little likelihood of being 
exceeded by actual costs, a good estimate. This greatly reduces the number of cost overruns 
and enhances the probability that all project phases in the 2YP get completed during the 
biennium. KyTC's Programming Staff might think a low estimate, which has a great 
likelihood of being exceeded by actual costs, a good estimate. This lessens the probability of 
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forfeited unless new work ;;an be brought into the highway plan for the current biennium. 
For this study, a good estimate is one that tries to forecast the actual cost, based on the 
information available. 
All estimates are based on experience. The accuracy of an estimate is determined by the 
information available from previou~ projects and how closely that relates to the current 
project. No two projects are exactly alike, and even those that are very similar can vary 
considerably in cost. Some reasons for this are inflation, job conditions, land prices, 
presence of utilities, environmental and historic concerns, and the economy. The first 
estimate for a new project is a conceptual estimate. For highway work in Kentucky, this 
usually means a quick estimate based on a brief description of the project, often no more 
than a road classification with starting and ending points. Under these circumstances, the 
accuracy of the estimate will be low, i.e., the variability of the actual cost will be high. 
As an example, a certain project has a conceptual estimate of $1 OM(illion) with a standard 
deviation ( cr) of 10% (roughly equivalent to a± 30% estimate). The graph in Figure 1 shows 
the probability distribution associated with the expected actual cost vs. the estimated cost. 
$7M $8M 
b 
a 
$9M 
Normal Distribution 
c 
$10M 
d 
e 
$11M 
Figure 1. Expected Actual Cost vs. Estimated Cost 
$12M $13M 
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The probabilities of the actual cost as related to the estimated cost ($1OM) are as follows: 
-Probability of going over estimate = 50% (area right of c) 
-Probability of coming in under estimate = 50% (area left of c) 
- Probability of actual being within ± 10% of estimate = 68% (area between b & d) 
-Probability of going over estimate by 15% = 7% (area right of e) 
-Probability of coming in under estimate by 15% = 7% (area left of a) 
Therefore, if the conceptual estimate reflects the expected cost ($1OM), and if the standard 
deviation (cr) of 10% is reasonable, a cost overrun exceeding 15% should be expected 7% of 
the time. Also, a cost underrun should be expected 7% of the time. 
Is this acceptable, given the 15% limitation? If the answer is no, there are two ways to attack 
the problem. The first is to reduce the variability with better project information for the 
conceptual estimate and the second is to purposely provide an estimate higher than the 
expected cost, i.e. pad the estimate. Both ways have their drawbacks. Better information 
requires more resources and a better scope of work. Padding the estimate, while reducing 
the chance of exceeding the estimate by 15%, increases the chance of major underruns, 
thereby underutilizing available funds. 
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Estimates developed using current methods have not proven sufficiently accurate to preclude 
cost overruns in excess of 15%. During the current biennium to date (7/1192- 2/13/94), 134 
overruns, totaling $69,503,094, have been submitted to the IJCT. All have been approved 
for additional funding. 
The following analysis is based on information compiled from all past copies of the 
Notification to Legislature's Interim Joint Committee on Transportation Concerning 
Project Phase Cost Overruns> 15%. This document, an overrun summary, is submitted 
by the KyTC to the IJCT for a phase overrun> 15% and is identified by a tracking number. 
Figure 2 shows a breakdown of the number of overrun occurrences, by phase. Figure 3 
shows a breakdown of overrun costs, by phase. 
Figure 2 - Overrun Occurrences by Phase Figure 3 - Overrun Costs by Phase 
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1 shows the cost and breakdown, by of the 134 overruns to date. 
Tables 2-5 show specific overrun causes for each phase and the number of occurrences of 
each. Because some overruns have more than one cause listed, the total number of cause 
occurrences may be higher than the total number of overruns for a phase. Entries in the 
column, Contributing Track Numbers, refer to the specific documents where a cause is used 
as justification for an overrun. A brief synopsis of the impact of the overruns in each phase 
is also provided. 
Table 1: Breakdown ofiDghway Cost Estimate Overruns by Phase. 
Phase Number of % Occurring • Total Cost of %Cost 
Occurrences Phase Overruns •• 
Design 13 9.7% $1,690,000 2.4% 
Right of Way 30 22.4% $6,646,000 9.6% 
Utility Relocation 38 28.4% $14,808,000 21.3% 
Construction 53 39.5% $46,359,094 66.7% 
Totals= 134 100% $69,503,094 100% 
* percent of the 134 overruns that occurred in each phase 
**percent of the total cost of the 134 overruns ($69,503,094) attributable to phase 
Design Phase Overruns 
Overruns in the design phase accounted for 9.7% of the total number and 2.4% of the total 
cost of all overruns: thirteen (13) overruns @ $1,690,000. Table 2 shows that 
underestimation because consultant fees were higher than the estimated in house design 
costs, underestimation of the complexity of the project, and scope changes due to worse than 
expected site conditions were the three primary causes for design phase overruns. These 
causes accounted for 69.3% of all design phase overruns. 
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Table 2· Breakdown of Design Phase Overruns - -
~·~·~ - "-
Cause/Justification Number of % Occurrence Contributing Track 
of Overrun Occurrences as (%of All Numbers 
Causes for Design Design Phase 
Phase Overruns Overruns). 
underestimation of complexity of project 3 23.1% 5, 88, 89 
necessitating further design effort over 
what was originally envisioned 
underestimation because consultant fees 3 23.1% 98,99,106 
were higher than the estimated in-house 
design costs 
scope changes due to site conditions being 3 23.1% 53,96,109 
worse than expected 
scope changes due to local and public I 7.7% 67 
pressure & involvement 
shift in alignment necessitating a greater 1 7.7% 2 
design effort than what was initially 
estimated 
underestimation of design cost for large 1 7_7% 25 
scale landscaping project 
initial estimate based on preliminary plans, 1 7.7% 37 
maps, and data 
Totals= 13 100% 
Right of Way Overruns 
Overruns in the right of way phase accounted for 22.4% of the total number and 9.6% of the 
total cost of all overruns: thirty (30) overruns @ $6,646,000. Table 3 shows that the leading 
cause for right of way overruns were changes in project scope made during the design phase 
and after the initial estimate was made. Scope changes in design arose for a variety of 
reasons. Oftentimes, changes were made to provide an improved facility over what was 
originally envisioned. Other times design calculations (i.e. hydraulic analysis, sight distance 
requirements, traffic impact studies, etc.) led to design changes involving more or different 
right of way parcels than originally anticipated. These design changes included shifts in 
roadway alignment, widening of the proposed roadway and lengthening of bridges and 
\ 
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preliminary plans, maps, and project information. This accounted for roughly a third of the 
right of way overruns. 
Table 3: Breakdown of Right of Way Phase Overruns 
Cause/Justification Number of % Occurrence Contributing Track 
of Overrun Occurrences as (%of All ROW Numbers 
Causes for ROW Phase Overruns) 
Phase Overruns 
changes in project scope as a result of 16 40% 3, 24, 51, 51, 55, 62, 63, 
decisions made in desigu 70, 71, 76, 83, 86, 95, 
108, 117, 118 
changes in project scope as a result of 2 5% 38, 59 
worse than expected site conditions 
initial estimate made with very 13 32.5% 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 16, 40, 59, 
preliminary plans, maps, and generalized 69, 71, 102, 105, 117 
data: estimate updated based on more 
desigu detail 
inadvertent omission 4 10% 1, 58, 70, 76 
new or modified legislation enacted after 3 7.5% 16,51,64 
initial estimate made 
improvement made to right ofway after 1 2.5% 72 
initial estimate was made j 
rise in land values in vicinity <>f proposed 1 2.5% 16 
right of way 
Totals= 40 100% 
Utility Relocation Phase Overruns 
: 
Overruns in the utility relocation phase accounted for 28.4% of the total number and 21.3% 
of the total cost of all oveTruns: thirty-eight (38) overruns @ $14,808,000. Table 4 shows 
that the most frequent caUIIe for utility relocation overruns, like that for the of right of way 
phase, came from changes made in the project scope during the design phase. Similarly, the 
second leading cause for Ultility relocation phase overruns was due to initial estimates being 
9 
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causes accounted for two-thirds of all the utility relocation phase overruns. 
Table 4: Breakdown of Utility Relocation Phase Overrnns. 
Cause/Justification Number of % Occurrence Contributing Track 
of Overrun Occurrences as (%of All Numbers 
Causes for Utility Utility 
relocation Phase relocation 
Overruns Phase 
Overruns). 
changes in project scope as a result of 20 37% 3, 4, 50, 51, 51, 52, 55, 62, 
decisions made in design 71, 75, 77,86,87,90,95, 
103, 104, 117, 119, 120 
initial estimate made with very 16 29.6% 3, 6, 7, 9, 22, 23, 39, 60, 
preliminary plans, maps, and genemlized 68, 69, 71, 82, 95, 102, 
data. Estimate updated based on more 105, 117 
design detail 
inadvertent omission 3 5.6% 11, 49,52 
accidental tmnsposition of two estimates 2 3.7% 8, 91 
in development of Y 
upgmde in utility line not realized at time I 1.9% 36 
of estimate 
new installed in proposed ROW after 2 3.7% 48, 120 
estimate made 
utility line thought to be privately owned 1 1.9% 48 
is actually publicly owned (this required 
full relocation reimbursement) 
increase in relocation costs over what was I 1.9% 49 
expected 
new laws enacted necessitating higher 2 3.7% 51,62 
utility relocation costs 
no inflation factor on estimate I 1.9% 82 
underestimation of state force I 1.9% 120 
involvement cost 
changes in scope due to worse than 4 7.4% 38,71,82,82 
expected site conditions 
Totals= 54 100% 
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Construction Phase Overruns 
Overruns in the construction phase accounted for 39.5% of the total number and 66.7% of 
the total cost of all overruns >15%: fifty-three (53) overruns@ $46,503,094. The majority 
of overruns to date have occurred in the construction phase. In addition, the construction 
phase comprised the largest percent of the total overrun cost, doubling that of the other three 
phases combined. Table 5 shows that the two leading causes for construction overruns were 
higher than expected unit bid prices and/or individual work item costs, and changes in 
project scope as a result of changes made in the design phase. These two causes were listed 
58.5% of the time. Changes in project scope due to worse than assumed site conditions were 
also common causes for overruns. 
Table 5: Breakdown of Construction Phase Overruns. 
Cause/Justification Number of % Occurrence Contributing Track 
of Overrun Occurrences as (%of All Numbers 
Causes for Construction 
Construction Pbase Pbase 
Overruns Overruns). 
higber tban expected unit bid prices 23 29.9% 12, 12, 15, 19, 20, 21, 26, 
and/or individual work item costs 28,34,35, 35,42,43,44, 
46,47,54,54,56,57,57, 
66, 79 
changes in project scope as a result of 22 28.6% 13, 18,21,26,30,31,34, 
decisions made in design 35, 41, 46, 54, 56, 61, 66, 
74, 79, 80, 101, 107, 110, 
111,112 
changes in scope due to worse than 16 20.8% 14, 17, 27, 32, 33, 65, 73, 
expected site conditions 74, 78, 84, 85, 92, 94, 97, 
112, 113 
initial estimate made with very 4 5.2% 15, 29, 57, 81 
preliminary plans, maps, and 
generalized data: estimate updated 
based on more design detail 
inadvertent o)llission 6 7.8% 19, 42, 43, 85, 93, 101 
(continued on next page) 
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Cause/Justification Number of % OccUITence Contributing Track 
of Overrun Occurrences as (%of All Numbers 
Causes for Construction 
Construction Phase Phase 
Overruns Overruns). 
higher than expected unit bid prices 23 29.9% 12, 12, 15, 19, 20, 21, 26, 
and/or individual work item costs 28,34,35,35,42,43,44, 
46,47,54,54,56,57,57, 
66, 79 
changes in project scope as a result of 22 28.6% 13, 18,21,26,30,31,34, 
decisions made in design 35, 41, 46, 54, 56, 61, 66, 
74, 79, 80, 101, 107, 110, 
111, 112 
changes in scope due to worse than 16 20.8% 14, 17,27,32,33,65, 73, 
expected site conditions 74, 78,84,85,92,94,97, 
112, 113 
initial estimate made with very 4 5.2% -!5,29,57,81 
preliminary plans, maps, and 
generalized data: estimate updated 
based on more design detail 
inadvertent omission 6 7.8% 19, 42, 43, 85, 93, 101 
complexity of construction 1 1.3% 21 
underestimated 
utility work done in construction phase 2 2.6% 45, 116 
bonuses for minimal traffic impact 1 1.3% 85 
given 
sporadic contractor activl.ty led to 1 1.3% 97 
higher than expected state supervision 
costs 
two separate construction phases 1 1.3% 100 
combined to minimize overall cost to 
state : 
Totals= 77 100% 
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• Design phase everruns account for only 2.43% of the total cost of all overruns reported. 
Design phase overruns are not a major problem. 
• Based on the 134 overruns to date, the following would likely have eccurred if estimates 
had been subject to the 15% overrun limitation only after the_ design phase was 
completed: 
• 72.5% of the right of way overrun causes would have been eliminated. 
• 66.6% ef the utility relocation phase overrun causes would have been eliminated. 
• 35.1% of construction overrun causes would potentially have been eliminated. 
• Changes in project scope as a result of worse than expected site conditions contributed 
23.1% of the causes listed for design phase overruns; 5% fer right of way overruns, 7.4% 
for utility relocation overruns, and 20.8% for construction overruns. Increased site 
investigation by designers and estimators might have reduced these overruns, however, 
some soil conditions and contamination will always present problems. 
• Construction phase overruns accounted for 2/3 of the total cost of all overruns. It was 
stated that 35.1% of construction overrun cause occurrence could potentially be 
eliminated if estimates were made after design was complete. An additional 29.9% of 
overrun cause occurrence could be reduced if accurate unit bid price data were used. 
• Causes for overruns resulting from omissions in the estimates, transposing of numbers, or 
switching of work between phases cannot be avoided unless estimates are updated 
periodically. 
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Twelve (12) District Highway Offices, representing 120 counties, are responsible for 
providing estimates, on request, for projects in their respective areas. Estimates for highway 
work typically start with a conceptual estimate and are updated several times during the 
preconstruction phases. A given estimate is classified by the amount of information 
available when the estimate is made. Depending on the phase involved, estimates may be 
classified as Class A, B, C, D or E, with Class A being the one based on the most 
information. 
The State Highway Engineer Guidance Manual contains a classification system for each 
phase of a project based on information available at the time of an estimate. The following 
estimate classifications generally apply to the four project phases in the 6YP. 
Preliminarv Engineering (Design) Cost Estimates 
• Class A - based on man hours 
• Class B -based on per mile and class of road (adjusted for complexity) 
• Class C - based on percentage of construction cost 
• Class D - based on a prestudy estimate 
I 
Right of wiDr Cost Estimates 
l 
• Class A- parcel-by-parcel estimate for right of way and relocation costs, plus 
I administrative and any court costs, based on complete right of way plans for 
~ 
. programming purposes 
• Class B- parcel-by-parcel estimate of right of way and relocation costs, plus 
administrative and court costs, based on joint inspection plans 
" Class C -right of way acreage costs and damages, plus improvements, relocation 
1 assistance, and number of parcels, based on plans available for preliminary line 
l and grade inspection 
' ~g 
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assistance, and court and administrative costs, with approximate number of 
parcels, based on limited studies of quad sheets, aerial photos, etc. 
• Class E - based on prestudy estimate 
Utilitv (Relocation) Cost Estimates 
• Class A - based on agreements with utility companies 
• Class B - based on fmal joint inspection plans 
• Class C -based on preliminary line inspection plans 
• Class D - based on study of quad sheets, phmning reports, and available aerial 
photographs 
• Class E - based on prestudy estimate 
Construction Cost Estimates 
• Class A- plan quantities or quantities for resurfacing, initial treatment, and Force 
Account 
• Class B - based on joint inspection plans 
• Class C - based on preliminary line plans 
• Class D - based on limited studies of quad sheets, aerial photographs, etc., or on limited 
studies for projects without plans, such as initial treatment, Force Account, and 
resurfacing 
Engineer's Prebid (Engineer's) Estimate 
• Class A - based on plan quantities actually advertised for letting - This estimate is 
prepared by the Estimating Branch and is privileged information which will be 
released only to those persons authorized by the State Highway Engineer. 
Typically, an estimate request for a potential project is presented to the district office which 
will oversee the project if it is authorized. Usually, at this time, the project is in the 
conceptual stage and no design work has yet been done. Even though project elements, 
15 
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be made in order to advance the project to the 6YP and the promise of funding. 
The District Preconstruction Engineer usually makes the initial estimate based on project 
type and beginning/ending termini, using a very rough cost per mile calculation, adjusted by 
an experience factor. There are no budgeted funds or time for making the initial estimate, 
which leads to a dilemma; i.e., the development of an accurate cost estimate requires time 
and funding, but a project can not receive funding without a cost estimate. The choice must 
be made whether to do some study before making the estimate or to produce a quick estimate 
with no study. If the decision is to do a small study, estimators charge their time to another, 
open project. This practice can contribute to a cost overrun in the wrongly charged project. 
The true cost of the charged project then becomes difficult to determine, thereby affecting 
historic data for use in future estimates. If the decision is to make the estimate without 
study, then the accuracy of the estimate is likely to be very poor. 
These estimates, which are submitted to the Programming Staff, may or may not be skewed 
to either increase the likelihood of having the project approved by the General Assembly (a 
low estimate), or to avoid the likelihood of incurring a 15% cost overrun in the future (a high 
or padded estimate). Indications are that projects in the past were often underestimated, but 
that current estimates are frequently padded. 
Some barriers to better initial estimates are: 
• Project scope is limited at the time the initial estimate is made. 
• Good historical data are not available in a readily useable form. 
• District Offices are often called on to make conceptual estimates on the spot. In spite of 
being extremely inaccurate, these estimates often end up in the 6YP. 
• There is no planning staff or planning budget in most district offices. Estimating duties 
fall to some staff member who has to charge his or her time to overhead or another, open 
project. This has the effect of overcharging an open job and losing accountability of the 
effort put into estimating the new job. 
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environmental staff l!Jld little way to account for potential impact. 
• Bridge costs are very difficult to estimate until drainage calculations are complete. These 
calculations are made during the design phase. 
• Many of the district offices rely on large scale, USGS maps for laying out a proposed 
project when preparing an estimate. The scale on these maps is not sufficient to insure a 
reasonable amount of accuracy; the width of a pencil line can cause a variance of ±25 
feet, making it very difficult for right of way and utility relocation estimates to be within 
15%. 
• In the past, there has been little accountability for estimates. Today, there is 
accountability but the incentive is to pad the estimates so that the projects are unlikely to 
overrun. 
Once an estimate has been submitted, the Programming Staff may place the project into the 
6YP. Frequently, however, a proposed project is delayed, and is placed on an unscheduled 
needs list which serves as a feeder for future editions of the 6YP. Another estimate should 
be produced at the time the project is advanced to the 6YP, but often is not, because of the 
lack of resources in the district offices. 
When phases of a project on the 6YP are advanced to the 2Yl', updated estimates should be 
made for those phases. In the past, this was not always done; however, recent efforts by the 
KyTC have improved this situation. Once a project becomes part of the 2YP and funding is 
approved, it is then subject to the 15% overrun limitation. 
There are numerous causes for estimates to change after projects are placed into the 6YP. By 
far the most common cause of changes from the initial cost estimates for all phases arises 
from changes in project scope. The problem of scope changes is an inevitable result of the 
limited design effort made prior to the initial estimate. A frequently occurring justification 
for overruns given by the KyTC is that only very preliminary maps and project information 
were available at the time the initial estimate was made. Often, key information like right of 
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design matures. Changes in pavement design, shifts in alignment, and increases in the 
originally assumed quantities are only a few of the reasons, resulting_ from making initial 
estimates based on a limited design effort, that have been cited by the KyTC as causes for 
phase cost overrun.s. 
Some of the cannon causes for estimates to change after the initial estimate are: 
• Some initial 6YP estimates advance to the 2YP without being updated. Even very good 
initial estimates are subject to changes caused by inflation, changes made to the proposed 
site while the project progressed through the six year plan, or new harsher environmental 
legislation passed after the estimate was made. 
• Some estimates appearing in the 6YP were changed after being submitted by a district 
office or were not produced by a district office at all. 
• Changes durillg the design phase: 
• engilleerillg work required to develop a preferred solution 
• environmental work which was unknown at the time of initial estimate 
• geotechnical work based on final project location 
• less experienced personnel borrowed from other districts, the central office and/or 
consultants 
• Changes durillg the right of way phase: 
• amounts of property and improvements needed 
• location of access controls 
• negotiations with landowners 
• appreciation of property durillg project development 
• high court awards 
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• Changes during the utility relocation phase: 
• poor utility company records showing actual utility locations 
• poor records of type of materials used in the past 
• congestion of areas affected 
• cost of property adjacent to project, if needed 
• geotechnical conditions at site 
• availability of materials 
• changes in law which affect minimum standards 
• Changes during the construction phase: 
• changes made in the previous phases 
• amount of competition for the job 
• the local economy 
In the past, too many projects got into the 6YP, primarily because low estimates allowed 
more projects to be authorized then available funds could cover. The result was that many 
projects got pushed out of the 2YP. Often, the reason for low estimates was to increase the 
probability of getting projects into the 6YP, and authorized. K.RS45.245 represents an effort 
to stop this practice. Accountability, such as that imposed by the law, effectively addresses 
these past practices but causes a new set of problems by allowing too few projects into the 
2YP. 
A stated purpose of the legislative oversight is to increase the KyTC's accountability for 
good estimates. True accountability and continuous improvement of cost estimates requires 
limitations on both overruns and underruns. When either of these occurs, the oversight 
should be to determine the cause and improve the process, not to assess blame. 
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• On the whole, a feeling of mistrust exists between the Legislature and the KyTC. This is 
unfortunate becanse only with both sides working toward the same goal can continuous 
improvement be realized. 
• A lot oftime is being spent unnecessarily by the KyTC. Since all overruns presented to 
the IJCT have been summarily approved, many in the KyTC consider the whole matter 
of oversight a power play between the Executive and Legislative branches of 
government. 
• Estimators now pad estimates in an effort to avoid overruns. This will surely lower the 
number of overruns but will considerably increase the need to pull outyear projects into 
the current biennial plan. 
• High estimates actually create a reverse incentive: since the project is authorized at an 
inflated level, there is no reason to try to save money on the project. 
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The following discussion centers on information received from Departments of 
Transportation in other states. This information is sketchy and requires considerable follow-
up and verification. The quest for additional information is ongoing. 
Phone contacts have been made in all 50 states and Washington D.C. In response to the 
fifty-one calls the researchers: 
• made good contact with valuable information obtained and a promise of documentation 
(examples, cost per mile data, etc.) to be sent (31 states), 
• made contact with the apparent proper office, but the information obtained is sketchy (1 0 
states and D.C.), or 
• are waiting for a return call from the appropriate party within the state's DOT (9 states). 
Formal questions were posed to all of the contacts about several areas of interest to this 
study. Findings to date are presented in Table 6. 
All contacts were queried about difficulties they face in their states when forecasting 
highway costs. Not surprisingly, most of the problems stated are similar to those found in 
Kentucky. The following are general statements of how some states are addressing problems 
in forecasting highway costs. These data are presented for information only, and are not 
intended to be statistically significant. Further research is required, and planned, on how 
other states address problems of forecasting highway costs. 
• Most states have some sort of cost per mile information that ties historical data to specific 
road classifications, which is used for initial estimates. 
• Most states have no legislative oversight after budget approval. 
• Many states have standard estimating procedures which are used by all districts, with 
help from the central office. 
• Many states update estimates on a specific schedule, some do so annually. 
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• Some states allocate highway funds by district or region rather than based on statewide 
needs. 
• Some states require preliminary engineering work to be completed before a project enters 
the highway construction plan. 
• Some states do all planning work on state funds in order to have a good estimate before 
projects are put into the highway plan. 
• Some states require that the central office submit all estimates to the Program 
Management Office. 
• Some states use packaged software, off-the-shelf or developed in-house, to assist in 
estimating. 
It is important to note that Table 6 indicates that nearly all states use some sort of cost per 
mile data in conjunction with road classifications to develop initial estimates, but Kentucky 
does not. This may or may not be significant since it is not known exactly how, and to what 
extent, these data are used by other states. Some district offices in Kentucky do have their 
own historical data to use for estimating but there is not a formal, statewide database 
available. This may also be the case in some other states. 
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ALABAMA 
ALASKA y y C!M N N 6 2 PHASE 0 N 
ARIZONA y y BEST GUESS, 5 1 PHASE 0 
ARKANSAS y y C!M y 3 I 
CALIFORNIA y PYPESCAN y 7 2 12 
COLORADO y y C!M y 5 1 PHASE 6 
CONNECTICUT N y SO. FT. OR LIN. F y 10 1 PROJECT 
DC y y 
DELAWARE y y 
FLORIDA y y C!M 5 I 8 y 
GEORGIA y y MUSTHAVEPE 6 1 y 
HAWAII y y C!M N N 6 2 PROJECT 4 N 
IDAHO y y 
ILLINOIS y y C!M y 5 I 9 y 
INDIANA PHASE 
IOWA y y C!M 5 1 
KANSAS y y 
KENTUCKY C!M y y N 6 2 12 N 
LOUISIANA y y 
MAINE 2 
MARYLAND y y C!M y y 6 1 
MASSACHUSETTS y y 
MICHIGAN y y 
MINNESOTA y y y 6 2 PROJECT 
MISSISSIPPI y y C!M y N y 3 1 PHASE N 
MISSOURI y y C!M y 15 1 10 
LEGEND EXPLANATION 
COST /MILE - Do you have a formal cost per mile database available for estimators? 
CLASS. - Do y_ou have a uniform road classification system for cost per mile data? 
INIT.EST.- What tools are used for conceptual estimating? 
EST RIW - Is right of way a separate estimate? 
EST. UTIL.- Is utility relocation a separate estimate? 
EST.PROC.- Do you have a standard estimate Procedure used throughout vour organization? 
ENG.EST.- Do you publish the engineer's estimate prior to bid? 
STIP YRS. - Length of state highway construction plan? 
BUDG. YRS.- Lengt_h of time covered in the appropriations budget? 
EST.SCOPE- Project estimate published by project or by phase? 
# DIST.- Number of highway districts or regions in state? 
DIST.FUND- Are hilll!.way funds earmarked by district or region? 
Table 6- Survey of Estimating Practices in Other States 
(continued on next page) 
23 
(continuation) 
E h 
~1~ I 
E~ s s c , -B 
N s T T N T T s 
c I T G I . # T 
L T u p p G 
s c A R T R E s D F 
T I s E I I 0 s y y c I u 
A M s s w L c T R R 0 s N 
T T s s p T D 
E ? ? ? ? ? ? E ? 
MONTANA y y 
NEBRASKA y y C/M N N y 6 I PROJECT 8 
NEVADA y y 
NEW HAMPSHIRE y y 
NEW JERSEY y y 
NEW MEXICO y y 
NEW YORK y y 
NORTH CAROLINA y y 
NORTH DAKOTA y y C/M N N y I PROJECT 
OHIO y y C/M N N y I PROJECT 12 
OKLAHOMA y y C/M y y y 3 I PHASE 8 
OREGON y y C/M y y y 6 2 PHASE 5 
PENNSYLVANIA y y I 
RHODE ISLAND y y 
SOUTH CAROLINA y y 
SOUTH DAKOTA y y C/M y y y 5 I PHASE 4 
TENNESSEE y y C/M N N N I PROJECT 
TEXAS 
UTAH y y 
VERMONT y y . 
VIRGINIA y y C/M y y y 6 I PHASE 9 
WASHINGTON y y C/M y y y 2 PHASE 
WEST VIRGINIA y y C/M PROJECT 
WISCONSIN y y C/M N N y 6 2 PROJECT 
WYOMING y y C/M y y y 6 I PHASE 5 
LEGEND EXPLANATION 
COST /MILE • Do you have a formal cost oer mile database available for estimators? 
CLASS. • Do you have a uniform road classification system for cost per mile data? 
INIT.EST .. What tools are used for conceptual estimating? 
EST RIW • Is right of way a separate estimate? 
EST. UTIL .. Is utility relocation a separate estimate? 
EST.PROC. ·Do you have a standard estimate procedure used throu~hout your or~anization? 
ENG.EST .. Do you publish the en~ineer's estimate prior to bid? 
STIP YRS. · Lenmh ofhi~hwav construction olan? 
BUDG.YRS. · Lenl!lh of time covered in the ilj)propriations budget? 
EST. SCOPE- Project estimate published by pn~ject or by phase? 
# DIST .. Number ofhimway districts or regions in state? 
DIST.FUND • Are himwav funds earmarked by district or relrion? 
Table 6- Survey of Estimating Practices in Other States 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The current process of forecasting costs for highway work in Kentucky isn't satisfactory to 
either the KyTC or the Legislature. The reason seems to be not so much that the cost 
forecasting ability of the KyTC has declined of late but that the Legislature has voted itself 
more oversight of the 2YP execution. The reporting requirements of the oversight law, 
K.RS45.245, impose additional burdens on an already seriously understaffed highway 
department. The limits imposed, whereby reporting is required, are in some cases impossible 
to meet, and in other cases possible to meet only with additional staffing and/or by not 
performing current duties. 
The choice seems to be to either accept the status quo or to try to mitigate the problem; 
solving the problem entirely--insuring that no project phase overruns its estimate by 15%--is 
not feasible. There are three ways to mitigate the problem of poor cost forecasting. The first 
is for the Legislature to either forego the oversight or to modify it so the KyTC can meet the 
requirements with current staffing levels, the second is for the KyTC to change how the 6YP 
and the 2YP are developed, and the third is for the KyTC to staff up as necessary to improve 
its estimating ability. All of these options have financial and political implications. 
The current oversight requirement has resulted in 134 overruns worth over $69 million being 
presented to the IJCT for review during the current biennium to date (7/1/92- 2/13/94). All 
of these overruns have been approved. The IJCT makes no concerted effort to track cost 
underruns, which would provide as much evidence of poor cost forecasting as overruns do. 
The oversight seems to be used not so much to improve KyTC's cost forecasting ability as it 
is to make a political statement about who is in charge of getting highways constructed in the 
Commonwealth. If this is indeed the case, and if blanket approval of all overruns is assured, 
then perhaps a continuation of the status quo is acceptable. However, currently the KyTC is 
trying to appease the IJCT by increasing estimates to reduce the possibility of having to 
report phase overruns in the future. This practice makes the development of a realistic 6YP 
and 2YP impossible, and has the potential of causing the loss of federal funds if and when 
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approved federal aid. 
The Legislature could either forego the oversight or modify it so the KyTC can meet the 
requirements with current staffing levels. A statute change would be required to forego the 
oversight or to change its provisions. Modifications that could mitigate the current problem 
include setting a realistic limit for both overruns and underruns based on the class of estimate 
in the 2YP, not 15% across the board; track overruns by overall project cost instead of by 
project phase; and/or establish a review process that requires the KyTC to inform the IJCT 
by report of all overruns and underruns, but to formally respond with backup data to only 
those overruns the IJCT truly thinks may need to be terminated, not those that will be 
slllllffiarily approved. 
The KyTC can change how the 6YP and the 2YP are developed. The most effective change 
would be to complete either an in-depth seeping study and/or preliminary design prior to 
adding a project to the 6YP. This would require that work performed prior to authorization 
of the 6YP be funded by state funds. 
The KyTC can staff up to improve its estimating ability. Increased staffing would require 
either the Executive Branch's approval for hiring additional personnel and/or KyTC's 
commitment to reallocate resources. The increased staffing would primarily include right of 
way and utility personnel to be involved in preliminary estnnating. Also, demands for on-
the-spot estimates would have to be curtailed so the increased staff could scope the proposed 
project prior to submitting the initial estimate. 
The three ways to mitigate the current problem are being used, to some degree, by other 
states. The largest notable difference between Kentucky and most other states is the 
legislative oversight requirement. While many states have some sort of progress review of 
the highway plan, almost none have legislative involvement after budget approval. Many 
states are better staffed for estimating than Kentucky and some states do a considerable 
amount of preliminary design work prior to a project being placed on the highway plan. 
26 
Regardless of which of the above-mentioned options, or combinations thereof, are selected to 
mitigate the current problem, improvement of the cui-rent estimating and cost forecasting 
process is possible. Areas this study will address during the next year are how to better use 
existing data, what unused data sources are available, and how to improve current estimating 
procedures. 
Estimates are a product of experience and information. Estimating experience has been 
disappearing rapidly in the KyTC. It is vitally important to develop databases and make 
them available to personnel throughout the state. These databases will not only improve 
estimating ability but will serve to help justify estimates that later tum out to be inaccurate. 
This study offers an opportunity to make improvements to the KyTC's cost forecasting 
ability and to the relationship between the KyTC and the Legislature. To seize this 
opportunity both the Legislature and the KyTC must communicate openly with each other, 
and with the researcher, in an effort to find a workable solution which considers both 
political and fiscal realities . 
. , 
27 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following preliminary recommendations are made, based on the findings of the first 
eight months of this three year study. It should be understood that the entire problem of cost 
forecasting will be considered more fully during the next two years. Substantial changes 
might be made to these preliminary recommendations. 
Areas where the KyTC should be proactive in improving the estimating process include: 
• Look for innovative ways to improve both estimates and relations with the Legislature. 
• Educate legislators in the art/science of estimating and the limitations of what can be 
done with current resources. 
• · Empower and encourage employees to find better ways to estimate, reward them, 
then standardize the improvements throughout the KyTC. 
• Add a front-end phase called Planning and include it in the 6YP. 
• Have more information available when making an estimate. 
• Delay adding a project to the 6YP until a seeping study is complete. 
• Develop statewide and regional databases from historical costs for all facets of 
estimating highway costs. 
• Assign more resources to estimating, with a method to account for their utilization. 
• Create regional databases for design, right of way, utility relocation and construction 
based on cost per mile and/or other parameters. 
• Provide planning resources in all district offices. 
• Set up a budget from either new or reallocated funds for the estimating effort, so that 
a cause and effect relationship can be established. 
• Develop a standard estimating procedure and train all estimating personnel on its use. 
• Establish a formal review policy and schedule for all estimates. 
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-------~·~~Bct:Qlli!~llestimator's name, date and estimate class for all estimates appearing on 
the Project Authorization Form (TC-10). 
Areas where the Legislature should be proactive in improving the estimating process include: 
• Reduce cost increases for right of way after route has been selected. 
• Prohibit development in the project corridor. 
• Require that local governments provide right-or-way or a guaranteed price. 
• Reduce unanticipated, and unknowable, environmental costs. 
• Fund environmental problems, unknown at time of initial estimate, from a source 
other than authorized project funds. 
• Require those who cause the enviromnental problems to clean them up. 
• IJCT adapt the oversight implementation to better track performance and reduce the 
added burden on the KyTC. 
• Explain to the KyTC personnel exactly what KRS45.245 aims to accomplish and 
work with them to reach the goal. 
• Track project phase underruns of> 15% as well as overruns. 
• Limit formal reports of overruns to those that have a potential of being disapproved. 
• Instead of a flat > 15% limit, use different limits based on class of estimate 
• Let projects be carried through Phase I design without the 15% limitation. 
A small group, representing both legislators and the KyTC, should work with the researcher 
to articulate details of a process that meets political and fiscal realities. This would facilitate 
the implementation of needed improvements and lead to better relations within state 
government. 
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PATH FORWARD 
Emphasis for the remainder of this year and for year 2 of the study will be on new and/or 
modified procedures and tools to improve the estimating and cost forecasting ability of the 
KyTC. Specific goals for year 2 are: 
• to develop statewide and regional cost-per-mile databases for conceptual estimating and 
for each of the project phases, 
• to continue contact with selected states which seem to have found effective ways to 
improve cost estimating for highway work and to investigate these methods for ideas 
worth adapting for the KyTC, 
• to spend extended periods in several district highway offices to better understand the 
problems encountered in initial estimates, and 
• to maintain contact with officials within the KyTC and the Legislature in an effort to 
develop a cost forecasting strategy that will satisfy both parties and will benefit the 
citizens of Kentucky. 
An example of a cost-per-mile database format for construction costs is shown in Table 7. 
This is just a preview of some preliminary work that will receive considerable attention 
during the second year of this study. 
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PROJCODE DISTRICT STATUS_RPT 
872 7 7-997.00 
606 4 4-168.09 
ROAD NAME MILES PROP 
GEORGETOWN ROAD 2.700 9 
RADCLIFF-I 65 2.318 23 
CONTRACTOR LOW_CIM AVG_CIM 
CENTRAL ROCK MINERAL CO. 2218468.57 2218468.57 
RIFLE COAL CO. 2116299.90 2318952.37 
Legend Explanation 
PROJCODE -project code, in numerical order by fiscal year 
DISTRICT- highway district assigned project 
STA TUS_RPT- identification number of project status report 
DA TELET- bid letting date, year-month-day 
STATUS- cmrent status, A-active 
COUNTY - location of project 
PROJNO - project number used by construction 
ROAD NAME- descriptive name of road 
MILES -miles of road involved in project 
DATELET 
·930924 
930625 
BIDS 
I 
8 
TYPE_OF_WK 
MAJOR WIDENING 
NEW ROUTE 
PROP- proposals, number of prospective bidders obtaining contract documents 
BIDS - number of bids turned in 
LOW _BID -lowest bid submitted 
SECOND_BID- second lowest bid submitted 
A VG_BID - average of all bids submitted 
CONTRACTOR- contractor awarded bid 
LOW_ C/M - cost per mile based on lowest bid 
A VE_C/M- cost per mile based on average bid 
TYPE_ OF_ WK - description of work type 
NO_LANES -number of lanes involved, where applicable 
PROJN0_2- project number used in other phases for same project 
PROJN0_3- project number used in other phases for same project 
STATUS COUNTY PROJNO 
A CLARK BRO 5260(23) 
A ANDERSON BRO 5118(21) 
LOW_BID SECOND_BID AVG_BID 
5989865.13 0.00 5989865.13 
4905583.17 4979653.13 5375331.59 
NO_LANES PROJN0_2 PROJN0_3 
-- M 8610001 SP 
2 RS 538!-00 SP 0478547 024 
